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THE LIFE ESTATE AND THE POWER TO COMMIT
WASTE: USING A POWER ANALYSIS TO RESOLVE
OIL & GAS TITLE ISSUES CREATED BY FUTURE
INTERESTS
ANTHONY J. FORD

I. Introduction
The law of future interests has a well-deserved reputation as a difficult
area of law: it “revels in unhelpful complexity, elevates form over
substance, and frustrates the very transactions it should facilitate.”1 Title
examiners and land professionals frequently encounter future interests and
have long recognized that the presence of a life estate can complicate oil
and gas development. 2 Development can be further complicated when the
creator of a life estate grants “extra” rights or powers to the life tenant.3 It
is generally acknowledged, for instance, that a grantor who creates a
1. T. P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 514
(2003). Future interests are, in another scholar’s pithy formulation, “ugly, ancient, and
absurdly complicated.” D. Benjamin Barros, Towards a Model of Estates and Future
Interests, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 20 (2009).
2. See Sheryl L. Howe & Scott L. Turner, Advanced Mineral Conveyancing and Title
Issues – Part 1, in ADVANCED MINERAL TITLE EXAMINATION: OIL, GAS, AND MINING, Paper
No. 1, 1-12 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 2014); see also 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1, at 211 (Anderson Publ’g Co. 1989) (“the life estate is…an
important estate in oil and gas transactions”). “A title examiner will often see conveyances
creating successive interests,” according to Howe and Turner. Howe & Turner, supra, at 112.
3. Howe & Turner, supra note 2, at 1-13 (noting the absence of case law addressing
the development rights of a life tenant who holds “without impeachment for waste”).
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tenancy for life can also endow the life tenant with the power to consume or
dispose of the corpus of the estate. 4 However, the effect of such a grant is
not always clear. 5
This paper surveys the available authorities that address life tenants with
the power to consume, or “waste,” the corpus of an estate in the context of
oil and gas development. Because of the limited case law on this topic,
cases addressing minerals other than oil and gas have also been included.
This paper first addresses the common law rules regarding ordinary life
estates. It then examines life estates with the power to commit waste, both
generally and within the specific context of mineral development. This
paper concludes with a survey of some of the types of powers that can
allow a party who does not own a fee simple interest in a property to make
a permanent, irrevocable change to its legal disposition, and discusses a
Texas oil and gas pooling case that is best understood as an application of
this “power analysis.”
II. Life Estates at Common Law
According to Prof. John Lowe, “[a]t common law, neither a life tenant
nor a remainderman can develop oil and gas, grant a valid oil and gas lease,
or create any other oil and gas interest without permission of the other
because neither possesses the full rights to the property.” 6 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted that it is “well
settled” that oil and gas development must have the consent of both the life
tenant and remainderman to be lawful. 7
4. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 111 (1936).
5. See JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 105 (4th ed. 2003). “[I]f the
instrument merely creates a life estate ‘without impeachment for waste,’” according to Prof.
Lowe, “there is an unanswered question as to whether the life tenant has the right to grant
lease rights beyond his or her lifetime.” Id.
6. LOWE, supra note 5, at 103.
7. Welborn v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 217 F.2d 509, 510 (10th Cir. 1954). See
also Eide v. Tveter, 143 F. Supp. 665, 671 (D.N.D. 1956) (“it is the uniform rule that the life
tenant…is not privileged to take oil and gas, nor has he the power to create such privilege in
others by way of lease of the land for oil and gas purposes”); Owen L. Anderson,
Geophysical “Trespass” Revisited, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 156 (1999). Williams &
Meyers cites to Welborn, Eide, and eight other cases from jurisdictions in the United States
in support of the proposition that a life tenant does not have the unilateral power to develop
minerals. 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND
GAS LAW § 512.1 n.1 (Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer eds., 2013); see also G.H.P.,
Annotation, Rights of Life Tenants and Remaindermen Inter Se as to Oil and Gas, 43 A.L.R.
811, pt. II (1926) (“it is established, practically without dispute, that a life tenant has no right
to exploit the gas and oil resources of the property for his own benefit”).
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When a life tenant and a remainderman jointly allow oil and gas
development to take place, they are free to agree to divide the proceeds of
the lease as they see fit.8 Absent such an agreement, however, the common
law of most states classifies royalty and bonus payments as part of the
corpus of the estate, with the life tenant entitled only to the interest earned
on the payments and the remainderman entitled to take the principle when
he inherits the estate.9 Rental payments, such as delay rentals, are classified
as income and paid to the life tenant. 10 The principal exception to these
rules is the so-called “open mine doctrine,” which allows life tenants to take
all of the royalties from any leases that were entered into, or wells that were
drilled, prior to the creation of the life estate.11
If the two parties do not jointly agree to allow oil and gas development, a
life tenant who unilaterally develops minerals commits waste against the
remainderman’s inheritance, while a remainderman who unilaterally
develops minerals commits a trespass against the life tenant’s present
possessory interest in the property. 12 Scholarly authorities generally
recognize two exceptions to this rule: a limited exception in cases where a
property’s minerals are threatened by drainage, and a broad exception when
a life tenancy includes an explicit power to commit waste.13

8. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, § 512.2 (citing to Welborn, 217 F.2d at 510).
9. LOWE, supra note 5, at 107-08. States that classify the property interest created by
an oil and gas lease as a license or profit could treat bonus as income, not corpus. See
VanAlstine v. Swanson, 417 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Franklin v. Margay
Oil Corp., 153 P.2d 486, 501 (Okla. 1944); LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND
GAS LAW 459 (6th ed. 2013) (“In such a jurisdiction, a bonus is consideration for the right to
invade the present possessory interest and should be treated as income to the life tenant”).
10. LOWE, supra note 5, at 107.
11. Id. at 108-09.
12. LOWE ET AL., supra note 9, at 450. See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, §
512.1.
13. E.g., WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, § 512.1. In cases of drainage, a court can
compel a life tenant to allow the drilling of offset wells in order to prevent waste of the
estate. See A.W. Walker, Jr., Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEX. L. REV.
125, 143-44 (1928). Any proceeds generated by the offset wells are treated as corpus. Id. at
144. A court that hesitates to act to prevent drainage of a mineral estate subject to a life
estate “does not support sound conservation practices and does not preserve the estate for
both parties, which was undoubtedly the intent of the grantor or testator,” according to one
analysis of this issue. Ernest R. Fleck, Selected Leasing Problems – Protection Leases, Life
Estate and Remainder Interest, Interest in a Particular Stratum, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 217, 233 (1969).
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III. The Life Tenancy “Without Impeachment for Waste”
It is possible for a grantor to create a life tenancy that is not subject to the
typical restrictions against committing waste. The Restatement (First) of
Property notes that the conveyor of a life estate has the ability to “create in
favor of the conveyee a power, either limited or unlimited, to dispose of the
complete property in such land.” 14 Early English law used the label
“without impeachment for waste” to describe a life estate with an unlimited
power to dispose of a property. 15 English cases on this issue tended to
focus on the right to harvest timber from land that is subject to a life estate
without impeachment for waste. 16
The general rule appears to be that a life tenant who holds an estate
without impeachment for waste has the same legal right to commit waste as
an owner in fee, including the right to develop minerals.17 However, a
direct application of this rule to cases in the United States may be
problematic. English courts limited the scope of the rule in equity: the
doctrine of “equitable waste” prevents a life tenant who is unimpeachable
for waste from exercising his power in an “unconscientious, malicious, or
unreasonable” manner. 18 Some scholars have defined equitable waste in
ways that could be read as even more restrictive: “[i]t would seem, then,
that a tenant for life unimpeachable for waste is in equity treated, in regard
to equitable waste, much the same as is an ordinary life tenant in regard to
legal waste.” 19

14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 111.
15. See Clement v. Wheeler, 25 N.H. 361, 365-66 (1852). The Statute of Marlbridge
(1267) allows tenants to commit waste only if they possess “special Licence had by Writing
of Covenant.” 52 Hen. 3, ch. 23, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Hen3c23/
52/23/section/XXIII. Lord Coke would later comment that a “tenant for life without
impeachment of waste has as great power to do waste and to convert it at his own pleasure,
as tenant in tail had.” Bowles’ Case, 11 Coke 79b, 83b (New ed. 1826).
16. See Clement, 25 N.H. at 365-367 (providing extended commentary on life tenancies
without impeachment for waste in English law).
17. 2 HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 639 (3d ed. 2013)
[hereinafter TIFFANY] (“the effect of such a provision is that the tenant can, at law, commit
waste to the same extent as a tenant in fee simple, as by cutting timber or digging minerals
for the purpose of sale”); see also 93 C.J.S. Waste § 9 (2014) (“Where a tenant holds
‘without impeachment for waste,’ he or she is enabled to do many things, such as cutting
wood or opening new mines, which would generally amount to waste”).
18. TIFFANY, supra note 17, §645.
19. Case Note, Waste – Tenant for Life without Impeachment of Waste – Whether
Entitled to Proceeds from Ornamental Trees Taken by the Government, 33 HARV. L. REV.
618, 618 (1920).
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In addition, life estates with a general power to commit waste – as
opposed to a power to commit specific types of waste in specific
situations – have historically been uncommon in the United States.20 As a
result, American courts have not had many opportunities to address the
concept of equitable waste: a New Jersey court once called it “a nebulous
term – a doctrine of obscure limitations….The difficulty is in delineating
the scope of the principle that seems to have governed the interposition of
equity in such cases.” 21 One commentator goes so far as to claim that “[i]n
this country…the extent to which there is such a thing as equitable waste, as
distinct from legal waste, appears doubtful.” 22 However, scholarly
authorities in the United States still generally assert that a life tenant
without impeachment for waste has the right to develop minerals, in spite of
the minimal case law addressing this specific question. 23
IV. Oil and Gas Development When a Right to Commit Waste Is Present
A. Explicit grants of mineral development rights
While the general rule seems to be that an explicit grant of development
or leasing rights will, unsurprisingly, 24 give a life tenant the right to
unilaterally execute an oil and gas lease, states courts appear divided as to
whether such a lease continues to be valid after the expiration of the life
estate. In an Indiana case, Ireland v. Francisco Mining Co., 25 a husband
20. TIFFANY, supra note 17, §639 (“Such a general provision as to waste is probably but
rarely to be found in this country”).
21. Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, 26 A.2d 865, 870 (N.J. 1942)
22. TIFFANY, supra note 17, § 645.
23. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, § 512.1; 3-83 AM. LAW OF MINING § 83.05
(Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. ed., 2d ed. 2014) (citing to a Texas case involving a life tenant
explicitly granted a right to “execute…oil, gas and mineral leases,” rather than one given a
general grant to commit waste); 93 C.J.S. Waste § 9 (2014) (citing to a New Jersey case that
does not address mineral rights, and addresses timber rights in a way that may not support
the annotation author’s position); Anderson, supra note 7, at 156 n.79 (citing no authority).
The Powell treatise notes that “in the United States the phrase ‘without impeachment for
waste’ is not frequently found, but phrases of similar meaning, raising similar problems, are
fairly common.” 8 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL REAL PROPERTY §56.05 n.75 (Michael
Allen Wolf ed. 2014). The supporting authorities cited by Powell, like the relevant English
case law, involve disputes over timber rights; a life tenant without impeachment for waste
generally has the right to cut and sell timber and keep the proceeds. Id., see also Sauls v.
Crosby, 258 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Derham v. Hovey, 161 N.W. 883,
884 (Mich. 1917); Clement, 25 N.H. at 361; Wingard v. Lee, 336 S.E.2d 498, 501 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1985).
24. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 111 (1936).
25. 151 N.E. 700 (Ind. App. 1926) (en banc).
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and wife conveyed a tract of land to their son, reserving “a life estate in
each of them in the land so conveyed.” 26 The conveyance also gave the life
tenants authority over mineral development:
[D]uring the life estates hereinabove mentioned, the respective
life tenants shall in turn have the right to mine and remove from
said lands, in the ordinary and usual course of mining, any coal,
petroleum, oil, natural gas and minerals found therein, and to
appropriate and use as their own the proceeds of such mining
without becoming in any manner accountable to the
remaindermen for waste. 27
After the husband’s death, the wife entered into an agreement with a coal
company: “she sold all the coal of what is known as vein No. 5,” receiving
a four cents per ton royalty on coal removed in return.28 The remainderman
filed suit, arguing that the life tenant did not have the authority to convey
title to the coal in place. 29 The court rejected the remainderman’s
argument, noting the clear and unambiguous language in the conveyance
regarding the life tenant’s right to mine and remove coal.30 Other states
have followed Indiana’s approach. 31
While Ireland does stand for the proposition that a court will give effect
to an explicit grant of authority over mineral development to a life tenant,
that case involves a sale of coal in place and so does not directly speak to
the validity of a lease after the expiration of a life estate. Texas courts,
26. Id. at 700.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 700-01 (asserting further that “the life tenant was a trustee charged in equity
with a duty, not to invade, but to protect the rights and interests of the remainderman”).
30. Id. at 701. “It is elementary law that the intention of the parties in the execution of
deeds and other like instruments must control,” according to the court. Id. (concluding that
“it clearly appears that it was the intention of the parties that the grantors in the deed . . .
should have the right to mine and remove the coal from the land”).
31. See Guest v. Bizzell, 271 S.W.2d 472, 475-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). There, a life
tenant given authority to execute oil and gas leases “for the purpose of meeting her [own]
expenses in life” was entitled to all bonus and royalty payments. Id. A life tenant given
such authority is entitled to decide whether executing a lease is necessary for his or her
support, according to the court: “so long as she acted in good faith and not merely for the
purpose of defeating the rights of the remaindermen, her decision on the question is final.”
Id. A Texas Court of Appeals decision reaffirmed Guest on this point in 1996. Montgomery
v. Browder, 930 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Tex. App. 1996). The life tenant was still alive when
Guest was decided, so the court did not have the opportunity to address the question of
whether the lease at issue would remain valid after the end of the life estate. See Guest, 271
S.W.2d at 473.
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however, have spoken on this issue, and case law in that state seems to
support the idea that such leases will continue to be valid after the life estate
ends. The life estate at issue in Amarillo Oil Co. v. McBride 32 was granted
the authority to “execute and deliver oil and gas, or other mineral leases to
all or any part [of the estate].”33 The deed creating the life estate also
explicitly addressed the continued validity of any leases after the life
tenant’s death:
And if oil, gas or other valuable minerals be discovered on or
under said land, then and in such case the leasehold estate shall
remain in the lessee, his heirs and assigns for such term and upon
such conditions and requirements of the lessee after the death of
my said father Dave N. McBride, as if he were living, except that
the rents and royalties therefrom shall be payable to my said
above named brothers and sisters [i.e., the remaindermen]. 34
The life tenant executed an oil and gas lease before he died, and the court
had little difficulty concluding that the lease remained valid after the life
tenant’s death. 35
Subsequent cases in Texas have upheld the validity of leases granted by
life tenants even when the scope of a life tenant’s authority to bind the
remaindermen is less clear than it was in Amarillo Oil. A lease executed by
a life tenant with the right to lease “for oil, gas, and mineral production, the
primary term of any lease not to exceed ten (10) years in duration and so
long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals or either of them, are produced
in paying quantities” was enforceable after the life tenant’s death. 36
Additionally, in 2004 a Texas appellate court held that a lease executed by a
life tenant with the power “during…her lifetime” to “make leases of
whatever nature” and “extract…all oil, gas and/or other minerals” remained
32. 67 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
33. Id. at 1099.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1101 (“The provisions of the deed…are not ambiguous”).
36. Glass v. Skelly Oil Co., 469 S.W.2d 237, 240-41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (“The
creator of a life estate may empower the life tenant to dispose of the corpus. The courts will
construe such provisions to give the fullest effect to the testator’s intentions”). The will
creating the life estates at issue in this case did not explicitly state that a lease ratified by a
life tenant would survive the expiration of the life estate. See id. at 238-39. Glass is
factually unique in that the mineral development rights of the parties derived from Texas’s
Relinquishment Act; the minerals at issue were owned by the state of Texas, but under the
Act the surface owner is given authority to act as agent for the state in regards to mineral
leasing, and is allowed to keep one-half of all bonus, royalty, and rental payments. See id. at
238.
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valid after the end of the life estate.37 “[W]e decline to hold,” said the
court, “that the time limits…placed on [the life tenant’s] exercise of the
powers granted to her – her lifetime – limited the types of leases she could
enter.” 38
As noted earlier, however, other states have shown a willingness to limit
the term of an oil and gas lease executed by a life tenant with explicit
authority over mineral development. In Waters v. Monroe Coal Co., 39 an
Ohio trial court held that a life tenant with the right to “use, possess and
sell…coal and timber” did not have the power to bind future interests; the
coal lease signed by the life tenant terminated upon his death. 40
Pennsylvania law, meanwhile, seems to require something like the explicit
grant of authority to bind future interests seen in Amarillo Oil. In 1898, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to terminate a lease after a life
tenant’s death, although there the remaindermen saved the lease by
ratifying it. 41 Had the ratification not occurred, according to the court, “in
the absence of anything showing a different intention, we would be forced
to the conclusion that this lease terminated at the death” of the life tenant. 42
In Doverspike v. Chambers, 43 a Pennsylvania court vacated a summary
judgment order upholding the enforceability of an oil and gas lease after the

37. Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 373-74 (Tex. App. 2003)
(emphasis omitted).
38. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original). The court further explained that “if a life tenant is
granted the power to lease, but cannot bind future interests, ‘there is very little utility to the
power because of the natural reluctance of any lessee to accept a lease which might be
terminated by the death of the lessor.’” Id. (quoting 1 KUNTZ, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 214).
39. 376 N.E.2d 977 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Muskingum Cnty. 1977).
40. Id. at 979 (“possess and sell from said land coal and timber”); id. at 980-81
(concluding “that the interest of the coal company in the subject property ceased with the
death of Fred Waters”).
41. Lake Erie Gas, Coal & Coke Co. v. Patterson, 39 A. 68, 68-70 (Pa. 1898). The
court described the remaindermen’s ratification as follows:
[A]ll of the parties interested in the property…joined in the execution of an
instrument in writing to the plaintiff, assuring it (the said plaintiff) that it would
not be dispossessed of the said leased premises, and agreeing to protect it in the
possession thereof, to the full end of the term of said lease, and to execute any
and all papers and assurances necessary to secure it in the possession of said
premises.
Id. at 68. The court held that this ratification was effective under the terms of the lease,
which it read as permitting the lease to remain valid as long as the life tenant could “through
his executors, administrators, and assigns…in any way secure the peaceable possession
guaranteed [to the lessee].” Id.
42. Id.
43. 516 A.2d 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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death of a life tenant with mineral development rights, because the life
tenant did not explicitly have authority to bind the future interests:
Unlike the intent to reserve a lease-making power in the life
tenant, there is no language in the deed or the lease which would
indicate any party’s intent to extend the lease given by the life
tenant beyond her life. Thus, we cannot say as a matter of law
that the life tenant had the authority to bind the remaindermen to
a mineral lease after the termination of her life estate.44
B. Grants that do not address mineral development
Some states have held that the power to initiate mineral development or
bind future interests does not have to be explicit, but can be implicit in the
grant of authority to the tenant.45 In addition, at least three states have case
law indicating that a general power to commit waste gives a life tenant the
right to unilaterally develop minerals and keep the proceeds.

44. Id. at 395-96. The deed creating the life estate in this case gave the life tenants the
“coal and mining rights” to the land. Id. at 394. The deed also noted that the property was
“under and subject to outstanding gas and oil leases” and assigned “the gas rentals and/or
royalties” to the life tenants. Id. The oil and gas lease at issue in this case was executed in
1976 – six years after the creation of the life estate – by the sole remaining life tenant. Id.
While it certainly seems possible to read the grant of authority to the life estate as limited to
mining rights only, with the life tenants entitled to royalties from the then-valid gas lease but
not authorized to execute any new oil and gas leases, the court rejected such an
interpretation. Id. at 395. However, its explanation does not seem entirely persuasive, given
that a right to royalty does not necessarily include development rights: “not only did they
intend to preserve their rights under existing leases, but they reserved…the right to gas
rentals or royalties. Therefore, it is clear that the grantors intended to give the life tenants
the power to execute leases in addition to those already existing.” Id.
The court did not directly comment on whether the language granting mining rights to
the life tenants would have been sufficient to give them power to bind the remaindermen
through a mining lease. On its face, however, the statement quoted above (“Unlike the
intent to reserve a lease-making power”) would suggest that the life tenant did have the
power to bind the remaindermen as to mining.
45. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Schuylkill Mining Co., 57 A.2d 833, 835 (Pa. 1948) (“it is
regarded as waste for a tenant in possession to open new mines or quarries upon the
premises and take rock, oil, minerals, etc., therefrom unless expressly or by implication
included in his agreement with the reversioner”). West Virginia, in a case where mineral
development was not at issue, has also given at least some recognition to the idea that a life
tenant can acquire a power by implication, rather than solely by an express grant. Ray v.
Frick Co., 57 S.E.2d 890, 893 (W.Va. 1950) (“it is not questioned that a grantor in a trust
instrument such as is here involved may, expressly or impliedly, reserve unto himself the
right and power to execute a lease which may extend beyond his lifetime”).
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In Danielson v. Danielson, 46 a father deeded a tract of land to his
children, who conveyed a life estate back to him in return.47 The
conveyance gave the life tenant the “right to use [the land], as he may deem
fit, and to receive the income and proceeds . . . .”48 The life tenant began
removing gravel from the land for commercial purposes; his children
protested the removal of the gravel and filed suit.49 A trial court
permanently enjoined the life tenant from removing gravel from the
property, but on appeal the Montana Supreme Court held that the language
of conveyance unambiguously gave the life tenant unrestricted use of the
land, and reversed. 50 According to the court, “the [lower court’s decision]
imposed a restriction on the use of the premises by the life tenant that the
parties themselves did not include in the written instrument creating the life
estate.” 51
Courts in Texas have also given some recognition to a life tenant’s right
to develop minerals, when the tenant has been granted a general right to
commit waste. In Singleton v. Donalson,52 a life tenant in Texas with the
power “to enjoy . . . [the] use and benefits" of an estate was entitled to all
bonus and royalty payments generated by the estate’s leases. 53 In an earlier
Texas case, a court imposed a traditional corpus/income distinction to
divide the proceeds of a lease executed by the owner of a life estate with a
right to sell the corpus “if necessary, for [the] comfortable support” of the
original life tenant. 54 However, there the court’s ruling was a product of the
unique facts at issue in the case, and not a rejection of the general principle
that a right to consume the corpus of an estate includes a unilateral right to
develop minerals.55

46. 560 P.2d 893 (Mont. 1977).
47. Id. at 893.
48. Id. at 894.
49. Id. at 893-94.
50. Id. at 894-95.
51. Id. at 895.
52. 117 S.W.3d 516 (Tex. App. 2003).
53. Id. at 519-20.
54. Johnson v. Messer, 437 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
55. Id. at 646-47. In Johnson, a widower had been granted a life estate through his first
wife’s will, and he later deeded the life estate to his second wife. Id. at 645. The second
wife had a right to sell the corpus only if necessary for the comfortable support of the
widower, and the court found “no evidence…to even indicate that it was necessary to sell the
real estate or execute the oil and gas lease for [the original life tenant’s] comfortable
support.” Id. at 645-46. The lease at issue in Johnson was executed by both the life tenant
and the remaindermen; its validity was therefore unaffected by the court’s decision. Id. at
645-46.
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Kentucky appellate courts have heard cases involving general grants to
commit waste at least three times. Life tenants in Kentucky who had the
power to use a tract “as they wish[ed]” were held to have the right to
exercise control over the timber and mineral privileges associated with the
land. 56 Later, a life tenant with “full and unconditional control” over a tract
was found to have the right to harvest timber. 57 Finally, Givens v. Givens 58
is the Kentucky case most often cited in support of the proposition that a
general right to commit waste gives a life tenant the right to develop
minerals. 59 The life tenant in Givens executed a coal lease with a 40 year
term and died nine days later. 60 The court acknowledged the general rule
that a life tenant has no authority to lease for a term beyond the expiration
of the life estate, but held that the power to encroach upon the corpus gives
a life tenant the authority to make a lease that will remain valid after the
tenant’s death. 61 “The argument,” according to the court, “is that if the life
tenant could convey the property, she could lease it. There is merit in this
argument.” 62
In addition, because the life tenant only had the right to sell the corpus, it is unclear if the
life tenant had authority to lease unilaterally. The court chose to explicitly note that it saw
the execution of a lease as distinct from a sale: “we do not consider that John E. Johnson and
Esther Johnson ever sold an oil and gas lease; but that they…only executed an oil and gas
lease.” Id. at 645. Kentucky courts, as discussed later in this section, appear to reject the
implication made by the court in Johnson that a power to sell the entire corpus of an estate
does not include or imply a power to lease the estate’s minerals. See infra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text.
56. Chappell v. Chappell, 119 S.W. 218, 219 (Ky. 1909) (unpublished). The life tenants
“had the right to use for life the land, its timber, and mineral privileges in any manner
necessary to enable them to have a comfortable support,” which seems to raise the
possibility that a mineral lease executed by these life tenants would have terminated at the
expiration of the life estate. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Cundiff v. Shackelford, 150 S.W. 670, 671-72 (Ky. 1912). This case also appears to
raise the possibility that, just as in England, equity could place limits on the actions a life
tenant possessing a general right to commit waste can take: “[i]t does not appear that she was
guilty of wanton and malicious waste in selling the timber in question…” Id. at 672.
58. 387 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1965).
59. See, e.g., WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 7, § 512.1 n.1.
60. Givens, 387 S.W.2d at 852. The court described the life estate as having “a power
to encroach upon the corpus,” but the opinion does not provide the precise language of the
grant. Id.
61. Id. The fact that the coal lease lessee was also one of the remaindermen may have
been a mitigating factor for the court in this case. Id. (“It may be observed that the
remaindermen will benefit from this lease”). The court also forced the lessee to share the
benefits of the lease with his co-remaindermen. Id. at 854.
62. Id. at 852. In support of this statement, the court cites to Holland v. Bogardus-Hill
Drug Co., 284 S.W. 121 (Mo. 1926) (en banc), calling it “[t]he only authority we have been
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Not all states appear to follow Montana, Texas, and Kentucky on this
issue. The Georgia Supreme Court, in a case not involving mineral
development, has stated that unless given express authority to do so, a “lifetenant with other broad authority, does not have the power to will the
property at his death, nor to lease property for a time extending beyond his
own term.” 63 Additionally, in Kansas it is at least possible that the rationale
in Givens – that the power to convey a property includes or implies a right
to execute an oil and gas lease that will bind successors-in-interest – would
not apply. In Woelk v. Woelk, 64 a life tenant who had “full power to sell
and convey . . . real estate,” but was expressly denied the power to
“mortgage or incumber” the estate was found to not have a unilateral right
to execute oil and gas leases. 65
V. The Power to Commit Waste
It is difficult to “find answers to new problems,” according to Prof.
Eugene Kuntz, without “appraisal of the policies and purposes behind [a]
doctrine.” 66 The purpose behind empowering a life tenant to commit waste
seems reasonably clear: it is to give the tenant the maximum freedom to use
and enjoy the corpus of the estate for his or her own benefit. As Prof.
Kuntz and a Texas appellate court have both noted, a court that focuses on
the purpose of a grant will be more likely to uphold the validity of a lease
from a life tenant after the tenant’s death: “[i]f the holder of the power
cannot bind future interests, there is very little utility to the power because
of the natural reluctance of any lessee to accept a lease which might be
terminated by the death of the lessor.” 67 Giving a life tenant a generalized
able to discover on this point.” Givens, 387 S.W.2d at 852. In Holland – a case that does
not involve mineral rights – a husband willed a life estate to his wife, giving her the right to
use and dispose of the property subject to the life estate “just as I should have power to use,
dispose of and enjoy it during my life for the use of myself and family did I survive her.”
284 S.W. at 122. The life estate included a building that the life tenant later leased out for
term of over twelve years. Id. at 121. The life tenant died before the end of the lease, and
the Missouri Supreme Court held that the lease was enforceable for its entire original term.
Id. at 126.
63. Phillips v. Sexton, 255 S.E.2d 15, 17 (Ga. 1979) (citations omitted).
64. 254 P.2d 297 (Kan. 1953).
65. Id. at 299, 301. The court ruled that the encumbrance restriction prevented the life
tenant from asserting a sole power to execute a lease; the opinion did not indicate how this
case would have been decided if the grant to the life tenant did not include the restriction
against encumbrances. Id. at 300-01.
66. 2 KUNTZ, supra note 2, § 20.4 at 126.
67. 1 KUNTZ, supra note 2, § 8.1 at 214; Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d
359, 374 (Tex. App. 2003) (quoting Prof. Kuntz).
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power to commit waste should, therefore, create a presumption that the
tenant has the authority to enter into agreements concerning the property
that will bind its future owners.
American law provides other examples of actions authorized under a
power that remain legally enforceable after the power is terminated or after
the principal’s death. An attorney-in-fact acting under a power of attorney
generally has the power to bind the grantor of the power of attorney and the
grantor’s successors in interest. 68 Also, when a party is given a power
coupled with an interest – that is, when a party is granted both a power and
a “present interest in the property upon which the power is to operate” 69 –
the holder of the power will have an agent’s customary ability to bind the
grantor, but also holds the power irrevocably. 70 The life tenant with a
power to commit waste is very similarly situated to the holder of a power
coupled with an interest: they both have a power over a given property, they
both have a present interest in the property they have power over, and the
power they exercise is not a “true agency power” – that is, the holder of the
power exercises it in his or her own best interests instead of the grantor’s,
and the grantor cannot terminate the power at will.71
Texas case law on oil and gas pooling can also be read as potentially
supporting the idea that a life tenant with the power to commit waste can
grant a lease that will continue to be enforceable after the end of the life
estate. In Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 72 a lease covering a tract of
land that was part of a pooled unit expired. 73 The Texas Supreme Court
held that the expiration of the lease did not remove the tract from the pooled
unit; the lessee’s decision to add the tract to the pool survived and remained
effective after the lease expired. 74
While the court’s explanation of its decision in Sheppard is not entirely
persuasive, 75 the result of the case can be reconciled with current
68. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-659(b) (2014).
69. HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 47(B) at 99 (2d ed. 1990).
70. Id. § 47(B) at 100 (“Generally, such a power is not terminated by the death or loss
of capacity of either the donor or the holder of the power”).
71. Id.
72. 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008).
73. Id. at 424. The Sheppard lease contained a provision terminating the lease if the
lessee did not begin paying royalties within 120 days of first gas sales. Id. at 421. Both of
the unit’s producing wells were located on the Sheppard tract. Id.
74. Id. at 424. “Just as owners and operators generally must agree to create a pool,”
according to the court, “they should also be able to agree when one terminates.” Id.
75. The court’s rationale seemed to be based in part on a distinction between leases and
lands: “both Sheppard’s lease and the unit agreement pooled certain ‘premises’ and ‘lands,’

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016

14

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 2

scholarship on voluntary oil and gas pooling, which involves the
application of a power analysis to the rights a lessor receives under a lease’s
pooling clause. 76 A pooling clause, according to Prof. Lowe, “grants the
lessee a power of attorney to pool the lessor’s interest.”77 Because the
lessee holds a power of attorney, it has the authority to make decisions that
can bind the lessor, even after the power of attorney is revoked or expires. 78
Given that there is little dispute that a life tenant with the right to commit
waste can grant a lease that will, at minimum, remain valid for as long as
the life estate exists,79 it is difficult to see how a life tenant could have the
authority to give a lessee a power of attorney to pool lands without
possessing a similar power to make binding decisions in his or her own
right regarding oil and gas development on the property.
VI. Conclusion
While the available case law generally supports the idea that a life tenant
whose estate is without impeachment for waste does not need the
remaindermen’s permission to develop minerals, it is unclear whether an oil
and gas lease solely executed by such a life tenant is sufficient to bind the
future interests after the expiration of the life estate. In Texas and
Kentucky, however, there is authority to support the proposition that a life
tenant with the right to commit waste can grant a lease that will remain
binding, even when that tenant has not explicitly been granted the right to
bind future interests. In addition, the very nature of the power given to this
type of life tenant suggests that the tenant’s right to permanently alter the
value of the corpus must necessarily include the power to issue a lease that
will remain valid after the life estate expires. Practitioners in states without
significant case law on this issue, however, may prefer to follow the
cautious approach advocated by some scholars: “[o]nly in the case where
the grant clearly establishes the right to alienate mineral is it appropriate to

not just their leased interests. Although Sheppard’s lease expired, the lands themselves
obviously did not.” Id. at 422-23. Whatever the validity of such a distinction, it does not
seem to adequately explain how the lessee’s rights under the lease gave it the power to make
decisions regarding the “lands” that would remain legally valid after the lease expired.
76. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 9, at 279-80 (“a pooling clause expands the lease grant
by giving a lessee the power of attorney to pool the lessor’s interest”).
77. LOWE, supra note 5, at 243.
78. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01-6.04 (2006).
79. See LOWE, supra note 5, at 105 (“if the instrument…creates a life estate ‘without
impeachment for waste,’ the life tenant has no duty to conserve the minerals against
depletion under an oil and gas lease” (emphasis added)).
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deal only with the life tenant. Even then, it is prudent to seek ratification by
remaindermen.” 80

80. Tom Galbraith & Timothy R. Smock, Remaindermen and Other Interest(ed)(ing)
People, MINING AGREEMENTS II, Paper No. 3, 3-9 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 1981).
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